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  This study assesses the effectiveness of the enforcement 
process used to implement China’s main industrial 
pollution clean-up legislation. Liguo Lin from the 
School of Economics at the Shanghai University of 
Finance and Economics is the study’s author. Using 
information from over 135 firms based in Fuzhou, the 
capital city of the Fujian province, he assesses how 
companies respond to environmental enforcement 
inspections and whether these inspections lead to 
improvements in the firms’ environmental performance. 
 
The study finds that many firms under-report their 
pollution production levels. This happens when they 
take part in the self-reporting process that is a key stage 
of China’s pollution control system. The study also 
shows that, while enforcement inspections do improve 
the veracity of the pollution reports that firms submit, 
these inspections do not significantly reduce the amount 
of pollution that firms produce. 
 
The study has important implications for policy makers 
as it shows that current environmental legislation and 
enforcement is not working. It shows that in order to 
control pollution both legislation and enforcement must 
be reformed to provide incentive for firms to actually 
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This study investigated how manufacturing plants reacted to inspections 
conducted by environmental authorities under pollution taxation regulations in China. 
Contrary to similar studies in the US, Canada (Magat and Viscusi, 1990; Laplante and 
Rilstone, 1996) and even China (Dasgupta et al. 2001), we found that inspections 
significantly increased the level of verified pollution emissions. This finding has 
important policy implications in showing that inspections by environmental authorities in 
China are effective in verifying self-reported pollution levels in industries, but not on 
lowering such levels. In order to really control pollution, a reform of the existing law is 
necessary. 
    
1. INTRODUCTION 
To reduce industrial pollution and improve environmental quality, governments of 
developed and developing countries have enacted a large number of environmental 
regulations since the beginning of the 1970s. However, imposing pollution regulations on 
manufacturing plants does not necessarily lead to a decrease in pollution or an 
improvement in environmental quality. In fact, it may even turn out to be ineffective if 
the regulations are not enforced. Enforcement, in this context, is a set of actions to make 
regulated agents (polluters) comply with environmental regulations. It comprises not only 
the monitoring of regulated agents, but also sanctions (such as fines and legal action) 
against them for non-compliance. Monitoring here refers to the collection and analysis of 
information on the compliance status of regulated agents based on sources which include 
but are not limited to inspections, ambient pollution samplings, and self-monitoring 
reports.  
    In most countries, the enforcement of environmental regulations involves self-
monitoring, that is, manufacturing plants have to report their pollution emissions at 
regular intervals to government environmental agencies. It is commonly accepted in 
literature that self-reporting saves a large amount of enforcement resources and improves 
the regulated agents' compliance with regulations (see Kaplow and Shavell 1994). A 
question which naturally arises here is: How accurate is self-reporting? Further questions 
would be whether inspections by environmental authorities make self-reporting more 
truthful or if they make plants reduce their actual pollution, or both. Inspections here are 
defined as on-site checks of plants by inspectors sent by official environmental agencies. 
    This study is on how polluters react to environmental inspections under China's 
pollution taxation laws. We sought to find out whether the inspections conducted by 
China's environmental agencies were effective in reducing industrial pollution. Our main 
finding was that inspections were effective in verifying pollution reports by firms, but not 
effective in reducing actual pollution emission levels. In order to really control pollution, 
a reform of the existing regulations is necessary. 
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The approach commonly taken in literature on this topic is generally based on the 
Theory of the Economics of Crime developed by Becker (1968). Downing and Watson 
(1974), Harford (1978), and Storey and McCabe (1980) were the first to apply the Becker 
theory in the environmental arena while there has been a rapid growth in its theoretical 
and empirical applications in recent years. 
Magat and Viscusi (1990) and Laplante and Rilstone (1996) estimated the impact 
of inspections on pollution self-reports by pulp and paper plants in the United States (US) 
and Canada, respectively, where pollution standards are legally imposed. These 
researchers reported that plant pollution reports by their respective sampled populations 
reflected the actual situation to a large extent. Magat and Viscusi (1990) showed that 
inspections permanently reduced the level of industrial pollution by approximately 20% 
while Laplante and Rilstone (1996) concluded that not only inspections, but also the 
threat of inspections reduced actual pollution emissions by plants by approximately 28%. 
Nadeau (1997) further found that inspections significantly reduced the durations of 
violations of air pollution standards by the pulp and paper industry in the US. Other 
studies extended the analysis to include other enforcement actions. Shimshacka and Ward 
(2005, 2007) used data, again from the pulp and paper industry in the US, to analyze the 
impact of a fine for water pollutant violations. All of these studies confirm theoretical 
prediction that industrial pollution is a decreasing function of the level of enforcement of 
pollution standards (see Harford 1978). Therefore, inspections by environmental agencies 
in the US and Canada have induced industry to ensure that they keep below the pollution 
standards set.  
The environmental regulatory framework in China is very different from the US 
and Canada. Although there are pollution standards in China, plants can just pay levies if 
their pollution levels exceed the set limits. Dasgupta et al. (2001) examined whether 
inspections had an impact on the environmental performance of Chinese polluters. Their 
dataset involved yearly-based plant-level data and their sample included plants which 
paid as well as did not pay pollution levies. They found that plant pollution emissions 
decreased by only a very small degree with inspections. There are also other Chinese 
studies in this context. For instance, Wang et al. (2002) showed that state-owned firms 
were subject to less strict enforcement measures by the government compared with 
private firms, and Wang and Wheeler (2005) found compliance with regulations varied 
according to plant characteristics (age, location, and so on). 
We were interested in studying how inspections explained the environmental 
performance of the plants in our study. Unlike Dasgupta et al. (2001), however, we 
adopted a unique dataset with quarterly-based plant-level information on environmental 
performance. Only plants paying pollution levies were included in our sample. We 
believe that our dataset has significant advantages over the one adopted by Dasgupta et al. 
(2001) in that quarterly-based plant-level data would better explain firms’ reactions to 
inspections than yearly-based data. Moreover, we expected plants which paid and did not 
pay pollution levies to have different reactions to inspections in that paying plants would 
be more inclined to under-report their pollution emission levels in order to avoid levies. 
To the best of our knowledge, our research is the first empirical study to analyze 
how levy-paying plants react to inspections by environmental authorities (the sampled 
firms in Magat and Viscusi (1990) and Laplante and Rilstone (1996) did not pay levies). 
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Our empirical results indicate that with pollution levies, inspections by environmental 
agencies were found to significantly and positively increase the level of verified pollution 
emissions1 by 8.26%. This also suggests that plants generally under-report their pollution 
emission levels in China. 
These findings differ greatly from those of Magat and Viscusi (1990) and 
Laplante and Rilstone (1996). As we mentioned before, they found that inspections 
reduced plant-reported pollution figures by a very large margin. They argued that self-
reporting by the industries well represented their actual pollution emission status while 
we treated the plant reports as prima facie information and not equivalent to actual levels. 
For instance, Laplante and Rilstone (1996) tested and concluded that firms did not 
systematically under-report their pollution levels, and although Magat and Viscusi (1990) 
did not do this test, they too reported that the firms’ pollution figures in their survey 
reflected actual levels. The institutional differences between China and the US and 
Canada explain these dissimilar results well. In particular, the US and Canada implement 
pollution standards while China uses pollution taxation to deter pollution. Other factors, 
such as penalties for fraudulent reporting, and environmental authorities' inspection 
strategies also explain the observation and are discussed more in detail later in this paper. 
    The rest of this report proceeds as follows: in Section 2, we describe China's 
environmental regulations in detail; in Section 3, we present our dataset, empirical 
models and results; and conclusions are given in Section 4.  
 
2. ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN CHINA 
China's industrial growth especially in the last three decades or so has been 
extremely rapid. Since the 1980s, industrial output has increased by more than 10% 
annually. Industry has become the largest sector in China's economy and now accounts 
for approximately 50% of China's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However, with this 
rapid growth, damage to the environment has become a serious problem and an obstacle 
to sustainable development. Industry is the primary source of water and air pollution in 
China today. Almost one third of China's waterways are near biological death from the 
excessive discharge of organic pollutants and five out of every seven rivers are badly 
polluted. In many urban areas, atmospheric concentrations of pollutants such as 
suspended particles and sulfur dioxide routinely exceed World Health Organization 
(WHO) safety standards by very large margins (Dasgupta, Huq and Wheeler 1997; World 
Bank 1997). China's State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) estimates that 
industrial pollution accounts for over 70% of the nation's total emissions of pollution 
(SEPA 1996).  
    Since the late 1970s, China’s national environmental regulations have been 
designed to reduce industrial pollution and improve environmental quality in a way that 
is consistent with the average level of social development. The Environmental Protection 
Law (EPL) was first adopted (on a trial basis) in 1979 by China's legislative authority and 
                                                 
1 Verified pollution emission levels refer to the amounts of pollution for which the sampled firms actually 
paid levies on. See also footnote 8.  
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officially enacted in 1989. In accordance with the EPL, a series of pollution control 
regulations was implemented and enforced by environmental administration authorities. 
The pollution control regulations have been amended several times in recent decades2. 
However, they have remained centered around a pollution tax charge which is called the 
pollution levy system. 
 
2.1 Design and Development of the Pollution Levy System 
Before 1993, the pollution levy system formally required that a plant pay a fee 
only if the quantity of effluent discharge exceeded the legal standard. Moreover, the 
pollution levy was actually paid only on the pollutant that exceeded its standard by the 
greatest amount, but not on all the pollutants that exceeded their standards. After 1993, 
levies at lower rates were imposed on plants that discharged within-standard water and 
air pollutants. Finally, since 2003, plants are required to pay levies on their three largest 
pollutants and the levy rates have increased dramatically. These new regulations are 
aimed at establishing stronger pollution control. Given that our dataset was based on 
industrial emissions of water pollutants for the year 2002, we will explain the pollution 
levy system for wastewater in 2002.  
    In 2002, China's pollution levy system was a two-tier pollution charge system, 
with uniform rates for within-standard pollution and higher, escalating rates for above-
standard pollution. If every pollutant emitted by a plant was below the respective 
standard for that particular pollutant, the plant had to pay the within-standard levy on the 
total amount of wastewater discharged3. Otherwise, the plant would have to pay the 
above-standard levy. 
    The above-standard levy was calculated with respect to those pollutants emitted 
by plants above their respective standards using the equation below. Now, consider a 
plant j emitting M number of water pollutants above their respective standards, namely, 
for each pollutant i (i = 1,...M), with a concentration (Cji) greater than the corresponding 
legal standard (Ci*).  
                                 max{ , 1,.... }j jiL L i M= =                                        
where, 
           2ji i jiL R P=  (for  jiP Ti≤ ) and 0 1i i jiL R P= +  (for  jiP T> i
                                                
)          (Equation 1)                             
 
where, Lji is the estimated levy to be paid by plant j on pollutant i; Pji is the discharge 
factor of pollutant i calculated as Wj((Cji-Ci*)/Ci*), where Wj is the total amount of 
wastewater discharged by plant j; Ti is the threshold factor that determinates the levy rate 
adopted; R2i is levy rate applied when the discharge factor Pji is below the threshold while 
the levy rate R1i (with R1i<R2i) is applied for above-threshold pollution; and  L0i = [R2i-
 
2 The regulations were amended in 1982, 1991, 1993 and 2003. 
3 Since 1993, the standard fee for within-standard pollution of wastewater discharge has been ¥ 0.05 per ton. 
Within-standard charges have also been imposed on SO2 emissions since 1996. USD 1≈ ¥7 in this study. 
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R1i]Ti is a fixed payment that makes the levy function continuous. The potential levy Lji 
is calculated for each pollutant i and the actual levy Lj is the greatest of the potential 
levies. 
The formula is calculated on a monthly base. To illustrate, we compute Chemical 
Oxygen Demand (COD) and Total Suspended Solids (TSS) levies for a plant with 
discharged water concentrations of 140g/l for COD (local standard = 100g/l) and 140g/l 
for TSS (local standard = 70g/l). The relevant ratio (Cji-Ci*)/Ci* is 0.4 for COD and 1 for 
TSS. The plant's discharge of wastewater W is 100,000 tonnes. Therefore, PCOD  = W∗0.4 
= 40,000 tonne.time and PTSS = W∗1 =100,000 tonne.time. The tax rates for the two 
pollutants are R1COD = ¥ 0.05/tonne.time; R2COD = ¥ 0.18/tonne.time; R1TSS = ¥ 
0.01/tonne.time; R2TSS =  ¥ 0.03/tonne.time. The regulatory threshold parameters for the 
two pollutants are TCOD = 20,000 and TTSS = 800,000 given exogenously by the regulation 
(i.e., they are regulatory parameters set by the regulation/law) and the fixed payment 
factors are L0COD = ¥ 2,600 and L0TSS = ¥ 16,000. Since PCOD>TCOD and PTSS<TTSS, 
applying the formula, the potential levies are LCOD = L0COD+R1CODPCOD = ¥ 4,600, and 
LTSS = R2TSSPTSS  = ¥ 3,000. Since the levy for COD is higher, the plant's water levy 
charge is ¥ 4,600. 
    The levy function takes into account both the concentrations of the hazardous 
pollutants and the amounts of discharged wastewater since it calculates the discharge 
factor (Pji) based on both the total wastewater discharged and the degree to which 
pollutant concentration (Cji) exceeds the standard (Ci*). The standard (Ci*) is jointly set 
by central and local government authorities, and it is different across industries and 
waterways into which the wastewater of the respective plant is discharged. Both levy 
rates (R1i, R2i) and the threshold factor (Ti) are set by the central government and vary by 
pollutant, but not by industry or region.4 
The levy system fails to provide industries with a strong incentive to control 
pollution. Firstly, the levy system integrates pollution standards and levies. In a way, 
firms can emit more pollutants by simply paying higher pollution levies. Although, in 
principle, firms can be penalized for violating the standards, the penalties are only 
imposed when their pollution levels exceed the legal standards by a large margin. 
Therefore the legal scenario with regard to pollution control in China is very different 
from the US and Canada. In the latter, exceeding the approved limits leads to an 
immediate penalty.  
Secondly, the levy system only requires plants to pay levies on the pollutant that 
exceeds its standard by the greatest amount; therefore, plants may only care about the 
pollutants they are paying levies for, and not bother about reducing their other pollutants.  
                                                 
4 The levy formula for air pollution is simpler. The within-standard levy is exactly the same as for the 
wastewater levy. As for the above-standard air pollution levy, unlike the water levy, it is assessed on the 
absolute emission amounts, rather than percentage deviation from the concentration standards. For firm j 
and pollutant i, the potential levy is Lji = RiVj(Cji-Ci*), where Ri is the levy rate; Vj is the total quantity of air 
pollutant emissions; Cji is the pollutant concentration; and Ci* is the concentration standard. Again, a firm is 
assessed only on the highest of its potential levies. 
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Thirdly, in some cases, a plant can end up paying higher levies even when its 
emissions are within the standards5. Finally, the levy system is not compatible with the 
principles of environmental economics since the more pollution a plant emits, the cheaper 
the marginal cost (levy rate) the plant is subject to (i.e., a plant pays its pollution levies 
according to the cheaper over-standard levy rate, R1, once its discharge factor is greater 
than the threshold level T, otherwise the plant pay levies according to the more expensive 
levy rate, R2. Note that the above-standard rate is a scaling rate including both R1 and R2 
differentiated by the threshold level T calculated using Equation 1). 
 
2.2 Implementation of the Levy System 
China’s State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) is a national 
agency that is empowered and required by law to implement environmental policies and 
enforce environmental laws and regulations within the different states. In practice, local 
(municipality and county/district) environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) are 
responsible for many activities pertaining to the actual implementation of environmental 
regulations. There are EPBs in all the districts of the municipalities. Municipal EPBs are 
mainly in charge of relatively big polluters while district EPBs deal with small polluters. 
Although legally accountable to SEPA, local EPBs depend heavily on local governments 
for financial and organizational support. 
    All polluters are required to self-report their pollution emission levels to 
environmental authorities by providing (a) basic economic information (sector, major 
products, raw materials, number of employees, and so on); and (b) information on their  
pollution emissions (amounts of wastewater, air or solid waste discharge, pollutant 
concentrations, etc.). The polluters' reports are verified by environmental regulation 
agencies in several ways, including monitoring, conducting inspections, and checking for 
inconsistencies between material input and output figures, and between present and 
historical data. Once the reports are verified, levies are calculated and collected by local 
regulation authorities monthly or quarterly. 
    The detailed procedures of implementing the levy system are as follows. At the 
beginning of the year, plants have to register with environmental authorities by providing 
their predicted quantities of pollution emissions for the year (based on their normal 
operations). Environmental authorities verify the registration reports and then issue 
pollution discharge permits to plants. During the year, plants are required to modify their 
reports should their actual emission levels differ from the predictions submitted at the 
beginning of the year. Environmental authorities verify plant reports by conducting field 
inspections. At the end of each quarter, based on the plant reports and inspections, they 
then notify the plants of the levies that they should pay for that quarter. 
                                                 
5 In the same framework as in the example given for calculating the wastewater levy, let us assume that a 
plant's discharged water concentrations are 90g/l for COD (local standard = 100g/l) and 65g/l for TSS 
(local standard = 70g/l). Hence, the wastewater discharged meets the standard. Again, let us assume that the 
plant's discharge of wastewater W is 100,000 tonnes. In this way, the plant pays the within-standard levy: 
W∗¥ 0.05/ton = ¥ 5,000. Compared with the wastewater levy charge in the wastewater example, it is 
obvious that the within-standard levy is even higher than the above-standard levy (¥ 5,000 > ¥ 4,600), in 
this case. 
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    In case of false information in any of the plant reports, the firms are liable to 
pay the evaded levy and between 100% and 300% extra as a punitive penalty.  When a 
plant is caught seriously under-reporting its pollution levels, besides the above penalties, 
it faces an additional fixed penalty. The total monetary penalty should, however, not 
exceed ¥ 100,000 (around USD 14,286). Although other non-monetary penalties are also 
available such as revoking discharge permits and shutting down facilities, they are rarely 
used. Hence, the penalty mainly involves a financial cost with a ceiling. Given this 
system, plants do not have a strong incentive to report their emission levels truthfully. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
3.1 Data Description 
The data used in the current empirical analysis was supplied by the Fuzhou 
Environmental Protection Bureau (FEPB). Fuzhou is the capital city of Fujian Province, 
which is located in the southeast part of China. Fuzhou's GDP was ¥ 31,582 (around USD 
4,511) per capita in 2003, ranking at 21st place among 658 Chinese cities. Over the course 
of the last decade, Fuzhou's industrial output has increased at an average rate of 12% 
annually. Fuzhou's eleventh five-year-plan (2006-2010) calls for further development of 
the food, medicine, chemical, automobile, and textile industries. However, as a result of 
this rapid expansion, the ambient quality of both air and water has deteriorated. For 
instance, in 2006, it was found that over 25% of the rain was acid with PH values 
between 5.0 and 5.6 (FEPB 2007). 
We selected the plants for our sample according to the following criteria: (a) they 
paid levies according to their COD pollution in the year 2002; (b) they belonged to the 
food, chemical, paper, or medicine industries; and (c) they were supervised by the FEPB6. 
We selected plants that paid levies for COD pollution because COD was the most 
common pollutant that large plants paid levies on, and we expected the decisions of the 
managements of these plants to be more sensitive to inspections. We concentrated on the 
four sectors which the large COD polluters belonged to.  
The sampling method, however, presented a possible problem; suppose that 
because of inspections, a firm had reduced its level of COD discharges and that in 2002, 
it did not pay pollution levies anymore on COD. By definition, this firm would not be 
included in the dataset since it did not pay pollution levies in 2002. However, in this case, 
the fact that it did not pay pollution levies in 2002 on COD was precisely because of the 
inspections. Thus, selecting only firms which paid pollution levies in 2002 could lead to 
significantly under-estimating the impact of inspections. So, we checked with the FEPB 
whether there were firms that paid COD levies in 2001 but not in 2002. We found that 
such a case was rare and that most firms paid pollution levies consistently on a certain 
pollutant. Therefore, it is unlikely that the results obtained in this analysis significantly 
under-estimate the impact of past inspections. 
                                                 
6 There are many small firms are supervised by county and district level environmental agencies. For 
instance, in Fuzhou, there are eight counties and five districts with an environmental agency in each of 
them.  
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Our dataset was different from the ones used in Dasgupta et al. (2001) and in 
Wang and Wheeler (2005), who also studied the environmental performance of industries 
with respect to China's levy system. Compared with the former who used annual data, we 
used quarterly-based observations and we also added the variable of value of output. 
Moreover, we only considered plants that paid levies. In Wang and Wheeler (2005), the 
authors did not include inspections in their analysis. 
Table 1 displays some descriptive statistics of our dataset. It contains the emission 
and production information of 137 plants for the year 2002. The 137 firms were those 
that satisfied the three criteria discussed above. The variables such as value of output, 
COD/TSS concentrations and discharges, levy rates, frequency of inspections, and 
frequency of citizens' complaints, were quarterly-based. Although the rest of variables, 
i.e., number of workers, age of the plants, sector, and ownership, were annual-based data, 
we simply treated them as quarterly data because they were not expected to significantly 
change within a year. The output values were collected from the Fuzhou Bureau of 
Statistics because the FEPB could only provide annual output values and we expected the 
variations in the quarterly output values to be an explanatory variable for quarterly 
changes in the pollution levels of the plants. 
Table 1 shows that the quarterly average number of inspections was 2.19 per plant. 
In fact, almost all the plants suffered at least one field inspection in a quarter and one 
plant had up to eight inspections. Note that we integrated two kinds of pollutants in our 
dataset: COD on which the plant paid pollution levies, and TSS that none of the plants 
paid pollution levies on. Plant TSS discharge concentrations were found to be much less 
than the COD levels. More than 60% of the sampled plants paid levies according to the 
low tax rate, so they (honestly) reported COD emissions above the threshold level. We 
also included citizens' complaints in our dataset. Apart from the normal field inspections, 
complaints made by citizens regarding environmental pollution incidents may trigger 
inspections and make plants further comply with environmental regulations. The average 
quarterly value of output was  ¥ 44.1 million (around USD 6.3 million) and the average 
number of employees was 443. Chemical firms made up 39% of our sample. Finally, 
although collective plants (in China, these are firms belonging to a village/town) were the 
most represented in our sample (45%), state-owned and joint-venture plants were also 
well represented. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of sample (quarterly data, 2002)  
Variables Mean per quarter Standard deviation 
Value of output               
(10 million yuan) 
4.41 6.52 
Number of Employees 443.28 321.66 
COD discharge (tonnes) 25.37 53.61 
TSS discharge (tonnes) 8.68 17.53 
COD concentration (mg/l) 310.99 85.92 
TSS concentration (mg/l) 145.78 78.15 
Age (decades) 2.29 1.31 
Inspection (no. of times) 2.19 1.52 
Citizen’s Complaints          
(no. of times) 
0.07 0.27 
Adapt to Low Rate 62%  
Adapt to High Rate 38%  
Food 37%  
Chemicals 39%  
Paper 15%  
Medicine 9%  
State-owned 25%  
Collective 45%  
Joint-venture 30%  
Number of plants 137  
Number of observations 548  
Notes: 
(1) COD means Chemical Oxygen Demand and TSS means Total Suspended Solids. Both refer to the water 
pollutants measured in this study.  
(2) Age means how long the firms have been established.  
(3) Adapt to Low Rate means the percentage of firms in the sample that paid taxation according to the 
lower rate R1COD (given that R1COD < R2COD), and vice versa for the Adapt to High Rate (R2COD ) variable. 
As shown in Equation 1, there are two above-standard rates for each pollutant: R1COD and R2COD (taking 
COD as an example).  
(4) Food, Chemicals, Paper and Medicine refer to the sectors.  
(5) State-owned, Collective and Joint-venture refer to type of ownership.  
(6) Number of observations is the number of firms multiplied by 4 because for each firm there were four 
observations corresponding to the four quarters of the year 2002. 
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A question which naturally arises with self-reporting is whether the plants 
accurately report their pollution levels. To some extent, this question can only be 
answered by those who make the reports: the plant managers themselves. In view of 
China's levy system, we expected that plants would be more inclined to submit false 
reports for three reasons. Firstly, the pollution taxation laws in China give polluters a 
strong financial incentive to try to balance the costs of true reporting (taxes) with possible 
fines (see also Wang and Wheeler 2005). Secondly, the legal liability for inaccurate 
reporting by plants is usually only a limited monetary penalty. Finally, the procedures of 
self-reporting provide plants with some room for under-reporting. According to the FEPB, 
most plant report estimations at the beginning of the year are significantly lower than the 
pollution levels they eventually pay for. Therefore, it is likely that the pollution emission 
data provided by the sampled plants in our study did not reflect the actual scenario.  
Enlightened by Laplante and Rilstone (1996), we intended to run a test of 
differences between the plant self-reports and the inspection data7. The on-site inspection 
data (i.e., the actual inspection records of each visit) were, however, not available to us, 
but we did have access to the firms’ self-reported data for the beginning of 2002 and the 
pollution amounts the firms paid finally paid levies on (the verified levels). We labeled 
the emission variables in our dataset as the verified pollution levels of the firms8 and 
amended the test by comparing the emission variables with the firms’ self-reported data. 
As indicated in Table 2, the resulting test statistics showed that both self-reported COD 
concentrations and quantities were significantly below their verified levels. We therefore 
concluded that firms systematically under-reported their pollution emissions. The reasons 
for this unsurprising phenomenon have been discussed earlier. It makes it interesting, 
however, to know how and to what degree inspections can make firms report truthfully 
(mainly in terms of their modified reports). 
 
Table 2. Paired difference of means test  
 COD concentration (mg/l) COD pollution (tonne) 
Mean verified measurements 310.9872 25.3651 
Mean self-reported measurements 285.6496 23.7757 
Difference 25.3376 1.5894 
T-statistics (H1: Difference > 0) 18.1959 8.4634 
 
3.2 Models and Results 
In this section, we provide the models and regression results in three steps. First, 
we discuss the ordinary least square (OLS) estimates of the basic model to examine the 
impact of inspections and then we check for possible biases in the simple OLS 
                                                 
7 Thanks to Benoît Laplante for making this suggestion. 
 
8 The emission variables (the verified pollution emissions levels) for a particular quarter were derived from 
plant self-reports and the results of inspections, whichever was applicable for the respective sampled firms, 
depending on whether or not they were inspected in that particular quarter.  
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estimations. Second, we modify our estimations by using a two-staged least square 
method with an instrument variable. Finally, we compare our results with those from 
previous studies. 
 
3.2.1 The Basic Model 
We first present a simple regression model by using OLS estimations. The 
objective here is to test for the impact of inspections on two sets of variables: (a) the 
absolute discharge quantities of COD and TSS; and (b) the levels of COD and TSS 
discharged relative to their respective standards 9  (namely, those exceeding the 
corresponding concentration standards). The following equation was used for all 
calculations – two each for (a) and (b) above.  
, 1 , 2 , 1 3 , 4 5 6i t i t i t i t i i i i i i tZ c INS INS OPT AGE EMP RATE SEC OWN ,β β β β β β γ δ−= + + + + + + + + +ε




Zi,t denotes the emission variable associated with plant i at time t; (In some 
specifications, Zi,t is the absolute discharge quantity, while in others, it is the 
quantity of the discharge in excess of the standards. Zi,t may be negative when it 
represents the plant’s relative TSS discharge10 and when it is within the standard.);   
INSi,t stands for inspections performed at plant i at time t (current inspections);  
INSi,t-1 correspondingly represents inspections at time t-1; 
OPTi,t is plant i's value of output at period t11; 
AGEi gives the age (in number of years) of plant i;  
EMPi is the number of employees in plant i; 
RATEi is a tax rate dummy that takes the value of 1 if plant i pays levies for its 
COD pollution according to the cheaper rate R₁; and 0 when it pays the more 
expensive rate R2; 
SECi is a matrix of dummies to indicate which sector plant i belongs to (food, 
chemicals, medicine, or paper); and  
OWNi is a matrix of dummies to represent a plant's ownership. 
 
 
9 The absolute discharge is W*C where W is the total amount of wastewater and C is the concentration of a 
pollutant. The relative discharge is defined as W*(C-C*), where C* is the corresponding concentration 
standard and (C-C*) is the discharge exceeding the corresponding concentration standard. The relative 
discharge is a good measure of how much a firm’s pollution discharge deviates from the standard. 
10 We only tested firms which emitted COD over the standard, therefore the relative COD discharge would 
always be positive. However, this did not necessarily apply to TSS emissions. 
11 We considered using “volume of output” instead of “value of output” since the former was more closely 
related to pollution. However, we did not have data on the firms’ volumes of output or input and we did not 
want to encounter measurement difficulties by using volume of output since the firms had different kinds of 
production.  
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We allowed for plants to be different in their production efficiency (with respect 
to pollution) in our analyses. Moreover, our model took into account the fact that the 
independent variables (plant-reported pollution) could be partly explained by the fact that 
actual pollution levels varied according to output levels. Given that a plant’s actual 
pollution was not observable, the value of output was a good measure of the variation of 
a plant's actual pollution across quarters due to variations in its production output. We 
assumed that a plant’s reported pollution was a function of its actual pollution for which 
the value of a plant’s output was a proxy.  
This model is different from traditional empirical analyses in this context. The 
value of output variable in our model takes on the same role as the lagged independent 
variables in previous studies. Laplante and Rilstone (1996) used a 12-period lagged 
pollution variable and Dasgupta et al. (2001) used a one-period lagged pollution variable. 
In fact, they acknowledged in their papers that it may have been better to use production 
output as a regressor in their models, except that the data was not available to them. 
Under the assumption that there were no drastic changes in the production and pollution 
abatement technology of the firms during the year 2002, the value of output made a better 
proxy for actual pollution emissions by a plant. As the emission data in our dataset was 
partly made up of self-reports and therefore, not expected to be fully reflective of the 
actual amount of pollutants emitted by the respective plants, using lagged independent 
variables could cause systematical bias. We also used number of employees, age of plant, 
sector, and ownership as regressors. Wang and Wheeler (2005) found that these variables 
significantly explained the difference in industrial pollution quantities across firms.  
The results of the above estimations are presented in Table 3. There are four sets 
of results corresponding to the two measures of two kinds of pollutants. As expected, the 
coefficients for the value of output variables were positive and showed a strong positive 
relationship with both COD and TSS pollution discharges, except for the relative TSS 
discharge. Besides the output value, other factors, such as sector and ownership also 
showed significant effects on pollution discharge. The coefficients for the sector 
dummies had very strong negative effects on COD discharge, while there were weaker 
and ambiguous effects on TSS discharge (negative on absolute TSS discharge but 
positive on the relative values). The reason is that medicine-manufacturing plants 
produce more COD than plants in other sectors. Moreover, plants in the medicine sector 
are comparatively large producers of absolute TSS discharge but not relative TSS 
discharge, which is the reason why the coefficients for the sector dummies showed 
ambiguous effects with respect to TSS discharge. Hence, it is not necessarily true that 
pollution by large polluters deviates more from the standards than emissions by small 
polluters. State-owned and collective enterprises appeared to produce more pollution, 
which is not surprising in view of the fact that they usually have lower production 
efficiencies than plants with joint-venture ownership and also because state-owned plants 
have much more bargaining power with environmental authorities in the enforcement of 
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Table 3. Results of emission equations (OLS) 
(Sample Size: 41112)  
COD Discharge TSS Discharge Independent 
Variable Absolute Relative Absolute Relative 
INSt 2.0532∗∗ 1.0974∗ 0.5694 0.0155 
 (0.9367) (0.6705) (0.3969) (0.3599) 
INSt-1 -0.3612 -0.6399 0.6364 0.6081 
 (1.0314) (0.7383) (0.437) (0.3962) 
OPTt 6.8907∗∗∗ 4.0358∗∗∗ 2.0990∗∗∗ 0.1284 
 (0.2758) (0.1974) (0.1169) (0.106) 
AGE 1.1226 1.1829 -0.0905 -0.4049 
 (1.3655) (0.9774) (0.5785) (0.5246) 
EMP -0.0002 0.0032 -0.0056∗∗ -0.0035 
 (0.0062) (0.0045) (0.0026) (0.0024) 
Rate -6.3792∗∗ -3.2934 -0.2427 1.7097 
 (3.1447) (2.2512) (1.3325) (1.2082) 
Food -37.9595∗∗∗ -26.8113∗∗∗ -5.7401∗∗∗ 2.5821 
 (4.6471) (3.3267) (1.9691) (1.7857) 
Paper -34.4710∗∗∗ -27.8507∗∗∗ -2.244 3.6405∗ 
 (5.0219) (3.5949) (2.2179) (1.9293) 
Chemicals -28.9541∗∗∗ -19.8509∗∗∗ -3.2032∗ 3.4754∗∗ 
 (4.2442) (3.0383) (1.7984) (1.6306) 
State-owned 14.7699∗∗∗ 6.7475∗∗ 7.1409∗∗∗ 2.5958∗ 
 (3.9503) (2.8278) (1.6738) (1.5176) 
Collective 9.7196∗∗∗ 5.9849∗∗∗ 2.5566∗ 0.0475 
 (3.1824) (2.2781) (1.3485) (1.2226) 
Constant 14.6644∗∗ 12.0357∗∗∗ 0.2173 -2.0758 
 (5.7726) (4.1324) (2.446) (2.2178) 
R² 0.8224 0.7682 0.6924 0.0508 
Note: The second row for each variable shows the standard deviations. 
 
                                                 
12 We had 548 (137 firms x 4 quarters) observations, but could not use the first quarter’s observations for 
each firm due to the one-period lagged inspection variable. Therefore 548 - 137 = 411 observations. 
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The coefficients for the current inspections were positive and significant for COD 
discharge but insignificant for TSS discharge. This might be because inspections mainly 
target the pollutant on which plants pay their pollution levies. It also might be that plants 
react to inspections by only paying attention to the pollutant that they pay pollution taxes 
on. Current inspections were found to increase verified absolute and relative COD 
pollution levels by 3.7% and 3.16%, respectively, while one-period lagged inspections 
showed no significant effect. These results provide strong evidence that plants under-
report their pollution, confirming our suspicions that the pollution emission data supplied 
by the firms in our dataset was not accurate. The results also show that inspections are 
effective mainly in terms of verifying plant pollution reports rather than being a deterrent 
in reducing industrial pollution. 
On average, there were four observations per plant for 137 plants. One question 
that naturally arose here was whether the estimated coefficients on inspections accurately 
explained how a plant reacted to inspections imposed on it. In other words, the 
coefficients of inspections in the above regressions might have been biased. For instance, 
if large polluters were inspected more frequently than small ones, the positive 
coefficients for inspections might just be explained by the fact that large polluters 
reported more pollution than small ones, and hence the inspection variable was just a 
proxy for polluter “size” (inter-plant effects). We expected the coefficients for 
inspections to estimate how a plant's reported pollution reacted to inspections (intra-plant 
effects). In order to test whether the coefficients for inspections caught inter-plant or 
intra-plant effects, we ran a simple OLS regression in which we averaged all quarterly 
variables for the 137 plants. The results are presented in Appendix 1. The average 
number of plant inspections was shown to have no significant influence on the average 
COD discharge amount. Therefore, we concluded that the coefficients for the current 
inspections in Table 3 mainly captured the intra-plant effects. 
Another concern in the context of this study was the possible endogeneity of 
inspections and its effect on the OLS estimates. If inspections were endogenous and 
correlated with the same variables that determined current pollution levels, then the OLS 
estimations would be biased. Put another way, inspections by environmental agencies 
themselves could be somehow triggered by plant pollution levels. Given this potential 
problem, it was sensible to conduct a test to ensure the exogeneity of current inspections.  
 
3.2.2 Exogeneity of Inspections  
In order to fix the above problem, we looked for another variable (instrument 
variable) to model inspections that did not enter the basic model13. A good instrument 
variable would be one that affected the dependent variable only through the endogenous 
variable. Citizens' complaints appeared to be a good candidate as citizens' complaints 
were made directly to environmental authorities and not to plants. Hence although 
citizens' complaints may influence plant pollution reporting, it would only be due to 
inspections conducted by environmental authorities in response to such complaints. We 
                                                 
13 One approach was to remove contemporaneous/current inspections from the model (Magat and Viscusi 
1990).   Another approach was to use inspections from past periods as the instrument variable (Laplante 
and Rilstone 1996). 
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ran a simple regression in which we put both inspections and citizens' complaints as 
regressors. The results are shown in the Appendix 2. Citizens' complaints turned out to 
have no significant direct impact on pollution reporting by the firms. On the other hand, 
citizens' complaints were positively correlated with inspections (correlation coefficient: 
0.3174). Hence, we could build a model that simultaneously involved both the 
inspections equation and the pollution emissions equation with citizens' complaints 
appearing in the former but not in the latter. The model is given below: 
, 1 , 2 , 1 3 , 4 5 6i t i t i t i t i i i i i i tINS c CMP INS OPT AGE EMP RATE SEC OWN ,α α α α α α μ θ−= + + + + + + + + +
, 1 , 2 , 1 3 , 4 5 6i t i t i t i t i i i i i i tZ c INS INS OPT AGE EMP RATE SEC OWN
σ
,β β β β β β γ δ−= + + + + + + + + +ε  
                                                                                                                  (Equations 3 & 4) 
where CMPi,t denotes the number of citizens' complaints against plant i in period t. Zi,t 
here only refers to plant COD discharge but not TSS discharge because there were no 
significant impacts of inspections on TSS discharge as shown from our OLS estimations. 
The Wald test using citizens’ complaints as the instrument variable strongly rejected the 
hypothesis of the exogeneity of inspections (Wald's statistics: 45.32). 
    We used two-staged least-square (2SLS) estimations. Estimation residuals are 
usually assumed to be identically and independently distributed (IID). However, in our 
model, the IID assumption was too strong, so we relaxed the assumption by allowing the 
distribution of residuals not to be necessarily identical for each plant (cluster robust with 
plants). The results of the first stage (inspection equation) are reported in Table 4, while 
the results of the second stage (emission equation) can be found in Table 5.  
The regression results of the first stage using the inspections equation revealed the 
inspection strategies of the environmental agency (FEPB). Firstly, larger polluters were 
more likely to be inspected than smaller ones. This was supported by the following 
observations: the coefficient estimates for the output value were positive and strongly 
significant; the plants in the medicine sector attracted many more inspections than plants 
in the other sectors; and inspections on state-owned plants (usually large polluters) were 
more frequent than on plants with other kinds of ownership. Secondly, one-period lagged 
inspections had a significantly persistent effect on current inspections in that firms were 
more likely to be inspected in the current period if they had been inspected in the last 
period. Thirdly, older plants were more likely to be inspected. Finally, citizens' 
complaints had a strong effect on inspections, a fact which was confirmed by our 
conversations with FEPB employees in that inspections were also triggered by citizens’ 
complaints. 
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Table 4. Results of the first stage (using the inspection equation)  





























Note: The second row for each variable shows the standard deviations. 
 
As for the emissions equation, the results were similar to those obtained in the 
basic model. However, here, current inspections appeared to have more impact on 
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verified pollution figures. Current inspections increased verified absolute and relative 





Table 5. Results of the second stage (using the emissions equation) 
(Sample size: 411) 
Independent COD Discharges 
Variable Absolute Relative 
INSt 4.5900∗∗ 2.7488∗ 
 (2.0753) (1.4348) 
INSt-1 -0.6754 -0.8445 
 (1.534) (1.0935) 
OPTt 6.7861∗∗∗ 3.9677∗∗∗ 
 (0.9446) (0.7706) 
AGE 0.5318 0.7983 
 (2.101) (1.461) 
EMP -0.0009 0.0028 
 (0.0129) (0.0102) 
Rate -7.6504 -4.1209 
 (4.9778) (3.2953) 
Food -35.4238∗∗ -25.1604∗∗ 
 (14.0931) (10.3594) 
Paper -32.2003∗∗ -26.3727∗∗∗ 
 (12.4133) (9.969) 
Chemical -27.7196∗∗ -19.0473∗∗ 
 (13.1287) (9.6395) 
State-owned 14.5182∗∗ 6.5836 
 (6.7465) (5.1723) 
Collective 9.6919∗ 5.9669∗ 
 (5.3236) (3.5315) 
Constant 10.9002 9.5854 
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 (16.5708) (12.2995) 
R² 0.8191 0.7647 
Note: The second row for each variable shows the standard deviations. 
 
3.2.3 Comparison with Previous Studies 
In this part, we present how and why our results are different from previous 
studies on this topic. Our regression results are very different from those of Magat and 
Viscusi (1990) and Laplante and Rilstone (1996) whose studies were based on US and 
Canadian cases where inspections were shown to reduce actual plant pollution levels by 
20% and 28%, respectively, while in this study, inspection increased verified emission 
levels by 8.26% (namely, by way of increasing the pollution levies paid by the plants). 
Therefore, in China, firms tend to under-report their pollution but in the US and Canada, 
plants do not systematically do this. This drastic difference can be explained by the 
different institutional arrangements between China, and the US and Canada, in terms of 
environmental regulations and enforcement. 
    China's environmental regulations are mainly based on pollution taxation/fees, 
while the US and Canada mainly use standards to control pollution. With taxation, the 
target of inspections is to make plants pay levies according to their actual emissions, but 
with standards, inspections aim at inducing plants to keep their emissions within the  
standards set. Thus, different regulations create different goals for the inspectors. 
In China, plants usually face only a limited monetary penalty for under-reporting 
their emissions, unlike in the US and Canada where fraudulent reporting is a serious 
criminal offense. As mentioned earlier, having a limited monetary penalty tempts firms 
into juggling the cost of non-compliance against the cost of the levies. However, in the 
US and Canada, plants prefer to report the truth even if they do not comply with the 
standards because the penalty for non-compliance is much less than for fraudulent 
reporting. 
Another factor is that in China, plants are required to make ex-ante self-reports 
while in the US and Canada, plant self-reports are ex-post. China's specific procedures 
give plants incentives to under-report their emissions. For instance, plants can just predict 
lower emission estimates in their reports at the beginning of the year and then decide 
whether to modify these depending on how many inspections are imposed on them. 
Finally, inspections made by China's environmental authorities are seemingly just 
to verify plant-reported emissions figures, while inspections conducted by US and 
Canadian environmental agencies provide a deterrent to non-compliance with the 
standards. For instance, in our data, the average number of inspections per quarter was 
2.19 per plant. However, in Magat and Viscusi (1990) and Laplante and Rilstone (1996), 
the corresponding numbers were 0.044 and 0.128, respectively. Moreover, one-period 
lagged inspections showed no significant effect on plants’ self-reports in our study, but in 
Magat and Viscusi (1990) and Laplante and Rilstone (1996), past inspections had a 
strong influence on the firms’ current state of compliance. There was also a difference in 
the inspection strategies of the environmental agencies: one-period lagged inspections 
showed a significantly persistent carry-over effect on current inspections in our case, 
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while the probability of a current inspection was a decreasing function of past inspections 
in Laplante and Rilstone (1996). This implies that environmental agencies in China target 
the verification of reports whereas the environmental authorities in Canada prioritize 
deterrence. 
Based on above considerations, we treated the self-reported emissions data from 
the firms in our study on a prima facie basis, unlike Magat and Viscusi (1990) and 
Laplante and Rilstone (1996) who treated these reports as equivalent to the actual figures. 
Hence, we explain our regression results as inspections increasing plants' verified 
pollution levels by 8.26%, while Magat and Viscusi (1990) and Laplante and Rilstone 
(1996) respectively concluded that inspections reduced plants’ actual pollution emissions 
by 20% and 28%. 
Our results are also different from those of Dasgupta et al. (2001), even though 
we both use data from China. According to Dasgupta et al.’s (2001) results, current year 
inspections reduced plants' verified pollution levels by a very small degree (0.40% for 
COD). The possible reasons of this difference are as follows. First of all, their data was 
yearly-based while ours was quarterly-based. Since field inspections have strong 
immediate effects, an inspection that happened a year ago may not influence a firm’s 
current decisions at all. Secondly, the dataset in Dasgupta et al. (2001) included plants 
that did not pay levies (57% of the total sample). Since plants only paid levies for one of 
their pollutants, there were even fewer samples that paid levies on their COD or TSS 
emissions which Dasgupta et al. (2001) used as dependent variables. Therefore, their 
sample size was very limited. Finally, in Dasgupta et al. (2001), the dependent variables 
(COD and TSS emissions) were measured only as the levels of discharge relative to the 
respective standards while absolute emission levels were not taken into account, whereas 




We adopted a unique dataset derived from the FEPB, China, in which we only 
included plants that paid environmental taxes on a specific pollutant (COD). By 
acknowledging the fact that their real pollution levels were unobservable, we simply 
treated the verified pollution figures as the actual. We provided clear empirical evidence 
that inspections conducted by environmental agencies significantly and positively 
increased the verified absolute and relative COD emission levels of the sampled plants by 
8.26% and 7.91%, respectively. This is strong evidence that plants under-report their 
pollution emissions. 
Our results are in contrast with similar studies in the US and Canada. The 
institutional aspects of China's environmental regulations explain the differences well. In 
particular, the US and Canada implement pollution standards while China uses pollution 
taxation. Moreover, China fails to provide plants with a strong incentive to report their 
emissions truthfully through setting limited monetary penalties for fraudulent reporting 
and its system of ex-ante self-reporting. Our results are also different from similar 
previous studies in China, the main reason being that our sample consisted only of plants 
that paid environmental levies.  
Our study has key policy implications. In particular, the impact of enforcement 
actions on the environmental performance of polluters depends heavily on the 
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environmental regulations themselves. China's regulations make environmental 
enforcement actions effective mainly in verifying pollution reports made by plants but 
not in reducing their actual levels of pollution. In order to effectively control and reduce 
pollution, a reform of the existing regulations is essential. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. Inter-Plant and Intra-Plant Effects  
(Sample size: 137) 
Average COD Discharge Independent 
Variable Absolute Relative 
Average INSt 2.0816 0.2722 
 (2.9209) (2.0968) 
Average OPTt 6.9003∗∗∗ 4.0729∗∗∗ 
 (0.4946) (0.3551) 
AGE 1.0743 1.2654 
 (2.4641) (1.7689) 
EMP -0.001 0.0028 
 (0.0111) (0.008) 
Rate -6.6513 -3.2481 
 (5.6359) (4.0458) 
Food -37.4749∗∗∗ -26.9390∗∗∗ 
 (8.4423) (6.0603) 
Paper -34.0759∗∗∗ -27.9485∗∗∗ 
 (9.0473) (6.509) 
Chemical -28.5390∗∗∗ -19.7829∗∗∗ 
 (7.5603) (5.4272) 
State-owned 14.8131∗∗ 6.9699 
 (6.9973) (5.0231) 
Collective 9.7433∗ 6.02 
 (5.635) (4.0451) 
Constant 14.1364 12.3332 
 (10.5967) (7.6069) 
R² 0.8224 0.7681 
Note: The second row for each variable shows the standard deviations. 
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Appendix 2. Results of Emissions Equations (OLS With Citizens’ Complaints)  
(Sample Size: 411) 
COD Discharges Independent 
Variable Absolute Relative 
Complaint 4.7478 3.0906 
 (4.2267) (3.0552) 
INSt 1.6252 0.8188 
 (1.0124) (0.7249) 
INSt-1 -0.1321 -0.4908 
 (1.0514) (0.7529) 
OPTt 6.9147∗∗∗ 4.0513∗∗∗ 
 (0.2766) (0.198) 
AGE 1.1516 1.2017 
 (1.3652) (0.9776) 
EMP -0.0007 0.0029 
 (0.0063) (0.0045) 
Rate -6.2163∗∗ -3.1873 
 (3.1472) (2.2536) 
Food -38.1208∗∗∗ -26.9163∗∗∗ 
 (4.648) (3.3282) 
Paper -34.8677∗∗∗ -28.1090∗∗∗ 
 (5.033) (3.6039) 
Chemical -29.2371∗∗∗ -20.0351∗∗ 
 (4.2506) (3.0437) 
State-owned 14.6128∗∗∗ 6.6452∗∗ 
 (3.9516) (2.8296) 
Collective 9.7142∗∗∗ 5.9814∗∗∗ 
 (3.1814) (2.2781) 
Constant 14.9177∗∗∗ 12.2005∗∗∗ 
 (5.7753) (4.1355) 
R² 0.8229 0.7688 
Note: The second row for each variable shows the standard deviations. 
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